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COMMENTS 
Soft-Science Examiners at the USPTO:  A Non-Obvious 
Solution to Reduce Erroneous Patent Grants 
In response to transnational efforts to globalize the economy, 
business firms are increasingly seeking intellectual property protection 
to protect their investments in research and development.  Companies 
have found it more profitable to apply for a patent and subsequently 
license the rights it produces rather than set up a subsidiary or a satellite 
branch.  In addition, companies have become more aggressive in 
seeking patents because the recent development of more complex 
technologies has expanded the patentable subject matter capable of 
protection.1  Companies are now flooding the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) with applications in their efforts to obtain a 
piece of the market. 
The increased number of patents applied for and granted in the last 
two decades evidences this novel business approach.  Patent activity has 
almost doubled since 1984.2  In 2003, the USPTO reviewed 
approximately 350,000 patent applications and issued some 180,000 
patents.3  The increased workload in the USPTO has dramatically 
affected trends in patent quality and has become the subject of many 
debates for reform.  Examiners spend on average only twenty hours 
reviewing each patent application.4  Because they lack the resources to 
 
1. Dale L. Carlson et al., Re-Thinking Patent Bar Admission:  Which Bag of Tools 
Rules?, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 113, 136 (2005).  U.S. patents are divided into 
searchable groups based on the technology claimed in the patent.  The number of patent 
classes and subclasses continue to increase with the development of new patentable subject 
matter.  In September 2002, 462 patent classes and 156,604 subclasses existed within the 
United States Patent Classification System.  Id.  In February 2004, the USPTO increased the 
number of patent classes by four and subclasses by 2079.  Id. 
2. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART 
CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2004, http://www.uspto.gov/go/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2005).  U.S. Patents Statistics Chart on the USPTO website states that 120,276 
patents were applied for in 1984 and 72,650 were granted.  Id.  In 2003, the numbers nearly 
doubled when 366,043 patents were applied for and 187,015 were granted.  Id. 
3. See id. 
4. Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform:  Economic Analysis and Critique, 19  
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1027 (2004). 
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both devote more time to individual applications and to conduct more 
thorough reviews, a number of patents may be issued in error. 
This Comment contends that soft-science graduates should 
participate in patent application review at the USPTO.  Soft-science 
examiners could conduct secondary reviews when questions exist as to a 
patent’s validity or obviousness.  This Comment develops its argument 
in four sections.  Part I examines the rising problems associated with the 
granting of erroneous patents.  It discusses the commercial and 
economic effects questionable patents cause in the marketplace.  Part II 
turns to the regulatory framework involved with the patent bar.  It 
discusses the history of the USPTO, and how it came to regulate the 
admission to the patent bar.  Part III is a critical assessment of the 
strategies currently in place.  It pays particular attention to the changes 
the USPTO has made to accommodate business-method applications.  
Part III also considers the effects of prevalent problems in patent law 
such as the “revolving door” and “regulatory capture.”  Part IV focuses 
on the proposed solution.  It discusses the reasons that militate in favor 
of including soft-science patent application review and answers any 
criticism that may be raised by commentators. 
I.  PATENT ERRORS 
A.  Scope of the Problem 
The USPTO issues too many questionable patents.  This is a 
problem that needs regulatory attention because patent award errors 
cost parties millions of dollars in litigation when the validity of a patent 
is tested in court.5  In addition, invalid patents affect consumers and 
competitors in the market if they are never litigated.  This has spawned 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice’s interest in patent reform.6  In October 2003, the 
FTC issued a report that focused on ways to promote innovation by 
balancing competition with patent law and policy.7  The FTC made 
 
5. See id. at 1028.  The number of patent-related cases litigated in federal courts has 
doubled in the last twenty years.  See id. 
6. W. Scott Petty, FTC Proposes Patent Law Reforms to Achieve a Balance Between 
Competition and Patent Protection, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2004, at 41.  The FTC 
conducts economic research and analysis to support its efforts to ensure that the nation’s 
markets are “vigorous, efficient, and free of restrictions that harm consumers.”  Federal 
Trade Commission, Guide to the Federal Trade Commission,  
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guidetoftc.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
7. See Petty, supra note 6, at 41. 
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recommendations for regulatory changes that would improve patent 
quality.8 
The FTC recognizes that “patent protection is aggressively pursued 
by members of a broad range of technology and services sectors.”9  In its 
report, the FTC considers the role that questionable patents play in 
competition and innovation.  Its recommendations, if implemented by 
the USPTO, would make it more difficult to obtain a patent and would 
make it easier to challenge questionable patents.10  Since the report was 
released in 2003, the FTC has continued its examinations into patent 
reform.11  It is apparent that changes need to be made at the 
administrative level of the patent process to properly balance the 
interests of consumers and innovators. 
B.  Economic and Social Impacts 
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have 
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”12  A patent confers certain 
rights to its owner.  It excludes other market participants from “making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented subject matter.13  There 
are several economic justifications for the patent system:  “it preserves 
the incentive for inventors to create, develop, and commercialize new 
technologies” and serves to encourage disclosure of information about 
new technologies.14 
 
8. Id.  Proposals presented in the FTC report include the following:  tighten legal 
standards used to evaluate whether a patent is “obvious”; consider possible harm to 
competition along with other possible benefits and costs before extending the scope of 
patentable subject matter; and expand consideration of economic learning and competition 
policy concerns in patent law decision making.  See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
9. Petty, supra note 6, at 41. 
10. Janet L. McDavid & Midna Schenchter, The FTC’s Recent Report, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 
8, 2003, at 13. 
11. See News Focus:  The Year Ahead:  What’s Happening Where in 2005, MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP., Feb. 2005, at 20. 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).  “The common law and not the patent law gives an 
inventor the right to make, use and sell his invention.  Patent law gives him the license to 
sue—the right to exclude others from using the invention.  This monopoly right is the unique 
quality of the patent property right.”  See Rawlings v. Nat’l Molasses Co., 394 F.2d 645, 647 
(9th Cir. 1968). 
14. John M. Olin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2007–08 (2005).  Information disclosed in a patent helps spur further 
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The FTC believes that the commercial impact of questionable 
patents is great.  Such patents may adversely affect competition and 
innovation.15  Companies that devote significant amounts of resources to 
research and development (R&D) fear that invalid or overly broad 
patents granted by mistake raise costs, impose uncertainty, and restrict 
product design choices.16  They believe that the number of poor quality 
patents issued each year “hinder[s] their ability to compete, to innovate, 
and to contribute to economic growth.”17  Competition is harmed and 
innovation is hindered in the following ways:  companies are forced to 
pay licensing royalties for patents that should have never been granted; 
companies incur great expenses when they choose to litigate over patent 
validity; and companies must engage in design-around efforts that raise 
their costs or hinder their product’s performance.18 
C.  Patent Error Effects 
The economic problems caused by poor quality patents affect rival 
companies, inventors, and consumers.  First, questionable patents 
influence the R&D decisions of competing companies.  These 
companies are discouraged from investing in areas of R&D that are, in 
fact, open to them.19  Secondly, inventors are affected because 
uncertainty over patentability causes them to behave inefficiently.  One 
commentator suggests that the “tremendous surge” in patent 
applications is the result of too many inventors seeking patent 
protection for inventions that are questionable.20  This “surge” in 
applications, combined with some uncertainty over patent quality, has 
lead to an increase in the number of invalid patents issued.  Finally, 
invalid patents affect consumers because competitors are foreclosed 
from competing in the market.  Consumers spend millions more dollars 
when market participants are not permitted to sell similar products and, 
thus, engage in price wars. 
 
innovation, reduce wasteful duplicative research, and lead to more efficient investment in 
innovation.  See id. at 2009. 
15. See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1018–19. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See Jonathan D. Putnam & Andrew B. Tepperman, Revisiting the Cost of Bad 
Patents:  For Whom Is “Rational Ignorance” Rational?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2004, at 
17. 
20. Id. at 18.  Some inventors are uncertain whether their inventions are patentable, so 
they file a patent application at the USPTO.  The costs of the application process are very low 
when compared to the costs of R&D. 
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When the USPTO issues a questionable patent, it undermines the 
patent system’s purpose of promoting progress.  Yet, an increased 
number of these patents issue every year.  This is a matter of public 
concern that should be paid particular attention because investment 
decisions are made daily that discourage the R&D of high-quality 
inventions.  It has long been known that society benefits when 
companies invest substantial resources to R&D.  Patent protection 
allows these companies the opportunity to recover their costs.  If these 
companies are unable to recover their costs because the USPTO grants 
questionable patents to their competitors, then they will be disinclined 
to contribute to future discovery and invention.  All of society will suffer 
when these companies choose not to further contribute to social 
progress. 
The problem with the USPTO patent process is that its examiners 
allow too many patents to issue that are either invalid or excessively 
broad.  A patent is only as reliable as the judgment of its examiner.21  
Unfortunately, these examiners are overworked and are forced to 
review applications using inadequate resources.  Examiners struggle to 
meet tough quotas that are based on speed and quantity, but not 
quality.22  The USPTO has approximately 350,000 applications on 
backlog, but it does not have the funds available to recruit and to retain 
more qualified examiners.23  The USPTO loses hundreds of examiners 
every year to a more lucrative private sector.24  At the same time, the 
number of patent applications the USPTO receives every year has 
increased by fifty percent since 1996.25  These statistics suggest that the 
source of the problem is at the examination level of the patent process.  
The USPTO needs to make stronger efforts to recruit and to retain 
qualified examiners.  To do this, it needs to consider making changes to 
its current qualification requirements for examiners. 
II.  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK INVOLVED 
The USPTO recognized both lawyers and non-lawyers as patent 
agents in the early to mid–1800s.  The non-lawyer agents “were 
 
21. See Megan Barnett, Patents Pending, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 10, 2002, at 
33. 
22. Id. at 34.  Ron Stern, President of the Patent Office Professional Association, 
stated, “The less work you do, the more credit you get.  If you find nothing [in prior art], 
you’re considered the most efficient of all.”  Id. 
23. Id. 
24. In 2000, only 375 examiners replaced the 437 examiners who left the USPTO.  Id. 
25. Id. 
SUEFFERT ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:50:32 AM 
116 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
particularly responsible for deceptive advertising and victimization of 
inventors.”26  Because they were not bound to adhere to the same 
professional conduct as their lawyer colleagues, the Commissioner of 
Patents required all persons practicing before the USPTO to register in 
1899.27  In 1922, Congress gave the Commissioner the authority to set 
criteria to recognize agents and attorneys in the USPTO.28  The 
Commissioner could prescribe regulations that govern the recognition 
of persons representing applicants before the USPTO and that may 
require them to show that they possess the necessary qualifications to 
render valuable service.29 
When the Commissioner began to regulate the “intelligence and 
moral character” of attorneys and agents in 1869, a substantial number 
of those that practiced were chemists or engineers familiar with the 
technical concepts to which the patent application is related.30  Today, 
persons who participate in the patent process must show that they 
possess the necessary legal, scientific, and technical qualifications that 
are required to provide the patentees with competent representation.  
An applicant to the patent bar is considered to have the necessary 
scientific or technical training if he or she has earned a minimum of a 
bachelor’s degree in one of sixteen accepted disciplines.31  The accepted 
degrees include the physical sciences, life sciences, engineering 
disciplines, and computer science.32  Although this list is not exhaustive, 
it does not easily allow for the expanding areas of technology that are 
becoming patentable. 
This may be one reason why questionable patents are granted.  
Examiners who are only qualified in traditional subject areas may issue 
invalid patents because they do not possess the necessary skills to 
review the applications filed in the new subject matter categories.  
Recent court decisions may also explain why such high numbers of 
invalid patents are granted.  For example, the Federal Circuit held that 
 
26. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 390 (1963). 
27. Id.  Congress granted the Commissioner of Patents power to regulate practice 
before the USPTO in 1861.  Id. at 388. 
28. Id. at 390. 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 31 (repealed Nov. 29, 1999). 
30. Sperry, 373 U.S. at 388–89. 
31. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT, PTO–05–001, 
GS–1224 (2004) 1, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/ohr/jobs/files/05-001.pdf  
[hereinafter QUALIFICATIONS LIST] (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
32. See id. at 1–6. 
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business methods were patentable in 1998.33  Mathematic algorithms, 
such as electronic, chemical, or mechanical algorithms, are patentable as 
a “process” if they produce a useful result and do not preempt other 
uses of the mathematical principle.34  Following the decision, the 
USPTO was swamped with applications related to business modules.35  
The numbers of applications submitted in this area continue to increase 
each year.  In 2004, approximately five times the number of applications 
submitted in 1998 was filed.36  Other courts have held other complex 
technologies patentable as well.  The expanding areas of technology 
have increased the number of patent applications that even qualified 
examiners must review.  The demanding workload is overly 
burdensome. 
III.  CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIES CURRENTLY IN PLACE 
So far, the USPTO has implemented strategies to redress this 
problem.  For example, it has instituted polices designed to improve 
patent quality in the area of business method inventions.  To meet the 
resource needs in the business method-related arts, the USPTO has 
brought together examiners and new hires who share the interests and 
necessary backgrounds to review applications.  The USPTO seeks 
examiners with knowledge and experience in the business method 
 
33. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998).  In State St. Bank & Trust Co., a patent was directed to a data processing system 
for implementing an investment structure for the administration and accounting of mutual 
funds.  Id. at 1370.  The court found that algorithms that are reduced to some type of practical 
application with a useful concrete result are patentable.  Id. at 1373.  The court also held that 
the patent in question was patentable even though its useful result was expressed in numbers, 
such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss.  See id. at 1373–75. 
34. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(citing State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1374–75).  In AT&T Corp., the plaintiff filed a 
patent describing a “message record for long-distance telephone calls.”  Id. at 1353.  The 
invention was “designed to operate in a telecommunications system with multiple long-
distance service providers.”  Id.  The court found that the plaintiff corporation’s patent was 
valid because it fell within the “process” category of the four enumerated categories of 
patentable subject matter.  See id. at 1361. 
35. See WYNN COGGINS, BUSINESS METHODS STILL EXPERIENCING SUBSTANTIAL 
GROWTH—REPORT OF FISCAL YEAR 2001 STATISTICS,  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/fy2001strport.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).  An 
examination work assignment program was initiated to meet resource needs in the business 
method-related arts.  Id. 
36. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 705, APPLICATION FILING AND 
PATENTS ISSUED DATA, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/applicationfiling.htm 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2005).  In 1998, 1340 applications were filed in the business related arts 
and 420 were granted.  Id.  In 2004, 6200 applications were filed in the business related arts 
and 282 were granted.  Id.  In 2001, 8700 business-related arts applications were filed.  Id. 
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area.37  These examiners likely possess data processing or computer 
degrees and relevant experience.  It appears that the USPTO’s business 
method patent initiative may be working.  Although the USPTO 
receives an increased number of applications each year, it grants fewer 
patents.  In 2004, 6200 applications were filed and only 282 were 
granted.38  This suggests that greater scrutiny has been given to the 
validity and quality of each individual patent. 
Many critics doubt the validity of business-related patents.  
Representative Howard Berman, a Democrat from California, critically 
assessed the strategy currently in place when he spoke at a hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property in 2001. 39  Representative Berman expressed several concerns.  
His first concern was that abstract ideas for conducting or organizing 
business operations that receive patent protection might preclude 
competition in business.40  Secondly, he was concerned about the quality 
of some patents granted.  Representative Berman believes that the 
USPTO issues patents that “simply cover age-old business practices,” 
and that these patentees should not be rewarded for “putting old wine 
in new bottles.”41  He believes that companies moving at “Internet 
speed” are especially at risk.42  They invest enormous sums of capital 
into their business plans and risk later learning that a rival company 
already patented important elements of their plan.43 
Representative Berman’s assessment of the USPTO’s business 
method strategy suggests that expanding patentable subject matter may, 
in some cases, adversely affect innovation.  Similar arguments can be 
made for other complex technologies.  Critics may alternatively argue 
that courts should continue to expand patentable subject matter as 
technology evolves because patent law encourages inventors to “push 
 
37. See COGGINS, supra note 35.  The USPTO sought examiners with experience in the 
fields of banking, securities, market analysis, real estate analysis, business consulting, 
management, sales, insurance, business information systems, and financial analysis.  See id. 
38. See supra note 36. 
39. 2001 Business Method Patents:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the  
Internet, and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. 72–299 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing]  
(statement of Rep. Howard Berman), available at  
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju72299.000/hju72299_0.htm (last visited  
Nov. 15, 2005). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.  Technology companies do not know what business methods are claimed in rival 
applications for at least eighteen months after filing. 
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the boundary of knowledge and possibility.”44  In fact, they may argue 
that the problems with questionable patents have nothing to do with 
subject matter.  Instead, themes of “regulatory capture” and “the 
revolving door” are prevalent in patent law.  These may be the primary 
reasons why so many invalid patents are granted. 
The issue of “regulatory capture” presents itself when regulators 
serve the interests of those they are intended to regulate.45  It occurs 
when regulators and regulatees work closely together.  In the USPTO, 
patent applicants cooperate with the examiners and provide them with 
the information necessary for the examiners to complete their review.  If 
the applicants’ attorney or agent earns the sympathies of the examiners, 
they may receive extra consideration.46  This leads to a point when the 
USPTO serves the interests of its subjects more than the general public.  
One problem associated with regulatory capture is that regulators tend 
to cooperate with their subjects and regulatees are, thus, able to use 
regulation to prevent competition.47  This is apparent in patent law.  
Companies and inventors are able to use the current examination 
process to keep down competition when they cooperate with an 
examiner who subsequently grants them a patent.  The USPTO 
examiners are too inclined to issue patents to the companies with which 
they work closely.  A poor decision will unfairly restrict competition in 
the marketplace.  The USPTO is a regulatory agency that has been 
captured. 
One commentator described the mechanics of regulatory capture in 
the following way: 
You give more attention to a particular law or agency if you feel 
that you have something at stake—you’re more likely to know 
about the laws and policies that affect your work, your hobbies, 
and issues of particular concern to you.  And if you’re someone 
important in a business that’s about to come under regulation, 
you have a lot at stake.48 
Examiners may not give sufficient weight to the social costs that 
 
44. Id. 
45. Posting of Bruce Baugh to BlogSpot,  
http://www.fortunewriter.blogspot.com/2002_06_30_fortunewriter_archive.html (July 3, 2002, 
13:35 EST).  Bruce Baugh is a freelance writer for Blogger, a service owned by Google that 
focuses on helping people have their own voice on the World Wide Web and organize the 
world’s information from a personal perspective. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
SUEFFERT ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:50:32 AM 
120 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
their decisions may have on parties in the marketplace, with the 
exception of the applicant.49  In many ways, this balance inquiry best 
describes all practitioners working in the area of patent law:  examiners, 
patent applicants, patent owners, and patent challengers.  Everybody is 
cooperating with each other to issue as many patents as possible. 
With the exception of the FTC’s recent interest in patent law reform, 
no outspoken advocates have highlighted patent issues and brought 
them into public attention.  Patent policy presents many economic and 
social issues that are of great concern to everybody.  The general public 
is greatly affected by the decisions of Congress and the USPTO, yet the 
issues that relate to patent law have not been the subject of public 
debate in recent years.  Discussion of reform is great among patent 
circles and those most affected by patent regulation, namely large 
corporations that seek many patents; however, there are few that lobby 
for the consumers and the other parties whose social interests are 
affected as well.  Without significant public participation in patent 
reform lobby efforts, that is, participation by persons and entities whose 
interests are not entirely related to patent law, little change to the 
system will be made.  The parties whose interests are most at stake will 
remain protected at the expense of others. 
Every regulatory agency has a duty to protect the public.  It may 
sometimes appear that the USPTO confuses this duty with one to grant 
many patents.  This situation presents a conflict of interest issue.  This 
conflict is only increased by the “revolving door” problem prevalent in 
the USPTO.  Each year, the USPTO loses hundreds of examiners to the 
more lucrative private sector.  These examiners leave to work for large 
law firms or in-house for large corporations.  In many cases, these 
examiners intend to work at the USPTO for only a short while.  The 
USPTO offers them invaluable experience that they later use to 
promote themselves within the profession.  One problem that this 
presents is possible bias.  These examiners review applications filed by 
law firms and companies for which they wish to work.  They may be 
more inclined to grant even more questionable patents if it will help 
them gain favor when they seek to enter the private sector. 
One reason these examiners aspire to leave their government 
position to enter the private sector is compensation.  In the USPTO, 
salary is dependent on the examiner’s individual knowledge or 
 
49. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1022–23.  Other companies and final consumers may also 
be affected when the examiner grants a patent.  Id. at 1030–31. 
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experience.  In 2005, an examiner’s salary scale started at $34,548.50  An 
examiner who has also earned a Juris Doctorate started at $49,729.51  
Examiners receive bonuses of up to ten percent of their salaries for the 
number of patents they issue. 52  This bonus incentive places pressure on 
the patent examiner to grant a questionable patent in error rather than 
deny it.53 
Examiners’ salaries cannot compete with the average starting salary 
for college graduates with degrees in the same discipline.  Graduates 
with a degree in civil engineering started at $43,159 in 2005.54  Similarly, 
graduates earned $51,042 with a degree in computer science, $51,113 
with a degree in electrical engineering, and $53,659 with a degree in 
chemical engineering.55  These salaries are approximately $10,000 to 
$20,000 more than what the USPTO can offer.  The starting salary of an 
examiner who obtained a Juris Doctorate is also quite modest when 
compared to patent attorneys.  The median salary for a Juris Doctorate 
in private practice is $90,000 nationwide.56  Patent attorneys make 
considerably more. 
The USPTO does not have the funds to compete with the more 
lucrative private sector.  It is especially difficult for the USPTO to 
compete for graduates with advanced degrees.  A person with very 
sophisticated academic accomplishments will not likely consider 
working for the government when the private sector lures them with 
much higher pay and prestige.  Although employers demand significant 
use of this specialized knowledge, they compensate examiners for the 
sacrifices they made and the time they spent acquiring that knowledge. 
 
50. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SPECIAL SALARY RATE TABLE,  
http://www.usptocareers.gov/salaryrates.asp [hereinafter RATE TABLE] (last visited Oct. 3, 
2005).  To determine grade, see QUALIFICATIONS LIST, supra note 31.  Pay levels are 
dependent on examiner qualifications.  See id. at 3–6.  An examiner with a bachelor’s degree 
will start at $34,548.  RATE TABLE, supra; QUALIFICATIONS LIST, supra note 31, at 3–5.  The 
examiner will start at $42,794 if he demonstrated superior academic achievement in school 
(GPA above 3.00).  RATE TABLE, supra; QUALIFICATIONS LIST, supra note 31, at 5.  
Examiners with one year of graduate education will start at $42,794.  RATE TABLE, supra; 
QUALIFICATIONS LIST, supra note 31, at 5–6. 
51. See RATE TABLE, supra note 50; QUALIFICATIONS LIST, supra note 31, at 5–6. 
52. See Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, 
and African Agriculture:  The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 357 (2004). 
53. See id. 
54. Blanca Torres, Getting in the Job Game, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 2005, at 1K, 3K. 
55. Id. 
56. Employment Rate Dips for New Law School Graduates, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 2003, at 
1.  The overall median salary for new lawyers was $60,000.  Id. 
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IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTION:  SOFT-SCIENCE EXAMINERS AT THE 
USPTO 
The USPTO should consider inviting soft-science graduates to work 
as examiners.  The “soft-sciences” as used here are the general 
disciplines of psychology, sociology, political science, and economics.57  
At least four reasons militate in favor of including soft-science patent 
application reviews:  (1) the USPTO can increase the number of 
examiners at a relatively low cost; (2) more time can be devoted to each 
questionable patent application review; (3) soft-science examiners use 
complementary skills and insights that might promote fewer erroneous 
patent approvals;58 and (4) fewer parties will be forced to litigate over 
patent validity. 
The first reason why the USPTO should recognize soft-sciences lies 
in relative costs.  The USPTO cannot always raise fees to provide for 
more funding.  Congress reserves the right to divert funds from fees 
paid to the USPTO.59  The USPTO has lost approximately $500 million 
in diverted user fees since 1990.60  In 2003 alone, Congress intended to 
divert as much as $162 million of the $237 million USPTO budget 
increase to homeland security efforts.61  The USPTO cannot continue to 
raise fees so long as Congress has the right to divert funds.  In the 
alternative, the USPTO can cut costs by hiring graduates with soft-
science degrees.  The average starting salary in 2005 is $29,060 for 
liberal arts graduates.62  The USPTO can compete with this figure.  In 
fact, it can offer soft-science graduates less than the $34,548 it offers 
 
57. See Wikipedia, Social Sciences, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_science (last 
visited Aug. 30 2005).  Soft-sciences, also known as social sciences, differ from the humanities 
and the arts in that the soft-science disciplines emphasize the scientific method in the study of 
the human aspects of the world.  Many scientists refer to the soft-sciences as the harder 
sciences given the complexity of their subject matter.  Psychology studies the human mind 
and behavior; sociology examines human society and human relationships; political science 
studies the governing of groups and countries; and economics concerns the production and 
allocation of wealth in society.  See id. 
58. See generally Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).  The soft-science 
disciplines emphasize the applications of scientific methods or other rigorous standards of 
evidence fundamental to scientific investigation and the acquisition of new knowledge.  See  
id. 
59. Joseph N. Hosteny, Post-Grant Opposition:  Building on Sand, INTELL. PROP. 
TODAY, Aug. 2004, at 8.  Congress continues to divert fees and this “shortfall may now 
approach $1 billion.”  Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Barnett, supra note 21, at 34. 
62. Torres, supra note 54, at 1K. 
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hard-science graduates because it can delegate different duties to the 
two types of examiners. 
The USPTO should maintain its strict science and technical 
requirements for the examiners who first review applications.  These 
examiners will review the claims in the patent and conduct a basic 
search for prior art.  The soft-science examiners can then conduct a 
more in-depth secondary search when there remains a question as to 
validity or obviousness.  This means that the average time spent on one 
questionable application will nearly double.  Any prior art that may 
have been missed by the first examiner is likely to be discovered by the 
second. 
Some critics may argue that soft-science examiners will not have the 
scientific or technical background necessary to read claims and, thus, 
cannot properly conduct a prior art search if they do not understand the 
subject matter they are researching.  To counter this argument, one 
could argue that a secondary reviewer does not need to have a 
sophisticated knowledge of the technical or engineering sciences so long 
as he or she understands the complex and sophisticated level of legal 
writing involved in constructing a claim.  The secondary examiner would 
only need to be familiar with claim drafting language and be efficient in 
researching prior art.  This can certainly help the USPTO weed out 
“thesaurus patents.”63  When applicants use multiple adjectives to 
describe an invention, two patents that are functionally redundant may 
be issued.64  An examiner may fail to discover prior art if different 
adjectives are used to describe similar inventions.  A secondary 
examiner may locate prior art simply by conducting different word 
searches.  This will prevent some invalid patents from issuing. 
Soft-science examiners may be particularly useful when considering 
whether a questionable patent is non-obvious.  A patent may not be 
obtained if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art would have been obvious to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art.65  Obviousness must be determined on the basis 
 
63. Barnett, supra note 21, at 34.  Applicants may use arcane or creative language in 
applications.  See id.  Examiners can fail to discover prior art in these situations because they 
may conduct only a basic search using a word or phrase in the claim.  Id.  These thesaurus 
patents can cost companies millions to invalidate patents.  See id. 
64. Id. 
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).  Non-obviousness requirements express congressional 
determination that the purposes behind the patent clause are best served by free competition 
and exploitation of that which is either already available to the public or may be readily 
discerned from publicly available material.  See Bonita Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989). 
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of both technical factors and secondary considerations, such as historical 
events and conditions.66  Secondary considerations that should be 
considered when determining obviousness are the following:  failure of 
others to solve the problem, long-felt need in the industry for the device, 
and widespread commercial success.67  Secondary considerations may be 
relevant in determining obviousness, but they cannot alone determine 
patentability.68  However, when these secondary considerations are 
afforded great weight, soft-science examiners may prove to be 
particularly useful.  Because the liberal arts foster a social awareness in 
its students, examiners who studied sociology, political science, 
economics, and other related disciplines may be in a better position to 
determine how society will better benefit if a patent is granted or 
denied.  A vast number of patents are invalidated in courts for 
obviousness.  Commercial success and long-felt need are not scientific 
concepts.  A secondary examiner can prevent invalid patents from being 
granted if there are questions as to its obviousness during review. 
Examiners with soft-science degrees may also alleviate USPTO 
problems with regulatory capture and the revolving door.  Critics have 
suggested that the USPTO is too inclined to issue patents without first 
weighing the costs to the broader public.69  Soft-science examiners could 
prevent this problem because it would be their responsibility to consider 
these costs.  They could better balance the interests of the inventor with 
those of rivals and consumers.  In addition, conflict of interest issues 
could be alleviated as well.  Soft-science examiners would not be 
interested in leaving the USPTO to work for patent law firms or work as 
in-house counsel at corporations because they could not promote 
themselves within the patent-related private sector.  For this reason, the 
soft-science examiners would not make biased decisions. 
Every year many patents are held invalid in court.  Parties spend 
millions of dollars litigating validity.  The average patent infringement 
case costs each party two million to litigate.70  One lawyer proposes that 
 
66. See Arthur J. Schmitt Found. v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 893, 
907 (N.D. Ala. 1966). 
67. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).  “[S]econdary 
considerations such commercial success, long felt but unfulfilled needs, and failure of others 
to devise are relevant indicia of nonobviousness.”  Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 
F.2d 432, 436 n.5 (9th Cir. 1967) (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18). 
68. Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Winegard Co., 402 F.2d 125, 127–28 (8th Cir. 1968). 
69. See supra note 45. 
70. Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:  
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent 
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 948 (2004).  Infringement cases cost parties 
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the USPTO could issue patents immediately after the applications are 
filed.71  He suggests that because parties litigate the validity anyhow, the 
USPTO should allow almost all patents to be granted without a real 
examination.  Unfortunately, litigation cannot be relied upon to assess 
patent validity.72  Sometimes parties may not be aware that an invalid 
patent exists that infringes on their own valid one.  Secondly, the costs 
of litigating an infringement suit may not be worthwhile for companies 
that risk losing many of their assets.  Many parties cannot afford to 
litigate.  The patent system serves as a tool to help inventors recover 
their costs of R&D.  It should not cost them nearly as much to defend 
their patent. 
The lawyer who suggested that the USPTO issue patents 
immediately believes that this is a possible way to reduce poor quality 
patents from being issued.73  He believes that the USPTO could do a 
better job if examiners’ workloads were reduced, and if the USPTO 
could maintain its budget.74  The same goal can be accomplished if the 
USPTO invites soft-science graduates to work as secondary examiners.  
This will certainly raise criticisms in patent circles, particularly because 
the patent bar has worked hard to establish its scientific requirements to 
ensure that its examiners are competent enough to work towards 
accomplishing USPTO goals; however, those who are seriously 
concerned about the current patent process should consider this reform 
idea. 
A.  Criticisms That May Be Raised 
Scientists who work for the USPTO or practice patent law are 
respected for their sophisticated knowledge of challenging disciplines.  
They may be concerned about their pay scale or their status in the 
patent community if the USPTO were to recognize soft-science 
examiners.  These scientists may fear that inventors would lose 
confidence in the USPTO.  Inventors may fear that their patents would 
be less secure.  To answer these concerns, the USPTO has current and 
proposed competence rules in place.75  Examiners must adhere to the 
 
$2 million when they risk losing $1 million to $25 million.  See id. 
71. Joseph N. Hosteny, Litigators Corner:  A Modest Proposal, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, 
Feb. 2005, at 12. 
72. See Bonita Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989). 
73. See Hosteny, supra note 71, at 13. 
74. See id. 
75. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.77 (2004).  A proposed competence rule makes it a conduct 
violation for examiners to handle legal matters without the sufficient legal or scientific 
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USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility.76  The Code states that an 
examiner cannot handle a legal matter in which he or she is not 
competent unless he associates with another practitioner who is 
technically competent in a matter.77  The soft-science examiners are 
competent enough to conduct a second prior art search when there are 
questions as to obviousness or validity.  The first examiner will always 
have the necessary scientific and technical training.  There would be no 
drastic changes made to this aspect of the current patent process.  
Secondary examiners would only assist the first examiner.  This 
proposal can be further supported if the first examiner sets up the field 
of the search and its guidelines.  There is no reason why practitioners or 
inventors should lose confidence in the USPTO. 
B.  USPTO Responses to Criticism 
For years, judges in the Federal Circuit have heard patent cases 
without formal scientific training.  Judges act more like “gatekeepers” 
because they assess how reliable the science is in patent validity cases.78  
They screen out unreliable science.79  One commentator suggests that 
judges become sufficiently competent to render decisions about 
scientific matters by virtue of their background or experience “on the 
bench.”80  Through their USPTO experience, these secondary examiners 
will also gain familiarity in the sciences by conducting searches.  
Another commentator has suggested that judges may be in the best 
position to rule on issues of validity or obviousness because they do not 
think scientifically.81  Because judges do not think in terms of 
mathematical algorithms or complex chemical equations, they can look 
at questionable patent matter from an outside perspective and say, 
“Gee, that is really obvious.”  Scientists may be so immersed in their 
disciplines that they are unable to recognize what is obvious to others.  
A soft-science examiner could offer this outside perspective as well. 
 
training.  Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,442–02 (Dec. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.  
§ 11.101). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1535, 1680 (1998).  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
79. Brewer, supra note 78, at 1680. 
80. Id.  The author discusses a judge’s competency to make decisions regarding 
scientific expert testimony.  Id. 
81. Interview with Professor Michael Henry Davis, Professor of Law, Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law, in Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 2005). 
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Most federal judges do not possess a strong familiarity of the 
technical and engineering sciences.  Yet, they have ruled on patent 
validity for years.  Soft-science examiners will not compromise the 
USPTO policy that examiners must meet the science and technical 
qualifications because they will only be used to conduct secondary 
reviews when the obviousness or validity of the patentable subject 
matter is in question.  The first examiner will continue to conduct the 
same prior art search that is part of the current patent process. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the USPTO has admitted practitioners to the patent 
bar that possess unique degrees, such as package engineering, in 
response to expanding areas of technology.  Because so few people earn 
highly specialized degrees, the USPTO cannot succeed if it recruits only 
these few graduates.  The business method initiative the USPTO 
enacted in response to the increased number of business module patent 
applications has proven successful.  By recruiting examiners with 
degrees and experience in market analysis, financial analysis, securities, 
etc., the USPTO has improved the quality of the patents it grants in this 
area.  If the USPTO recruits examiners who have majored in the soft-
sciences, fewer weak or questionable patents would be issued as well.  
The USPTO would be able to devote more time to review questionable 
subject matter.  Not as many invalid patents would be granted, and 
fewer parties would be forced to spend millions on litigation.  The 
USPTO would also save substantial funds because the salaries it could 
offer to the new examiners would not be as financially burdensome. 
Inviting people with soft-science degrees into the USPTO is a 
reform proposal that deserves considerable attention.  A proper 
regulatory proposal needs to address weak and poor quality patents and 
the problems they create in the marketplace.  Many of the problems the 
USPTO faces can be resolved, in part, by this proposal.  The patent 
system encourages inventors to push beyond the boundary of 
possibility.82  Perhaps the USPTO should push beyond its own 
boundaries and consider utilizing soft-science examiners. 
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